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the circumstances and context surrounding the communication. 475

New York, on the other hand, refuses to stop at Milkovich and
looks at the surrounding circumstances. For example, in Immuno,
the court stated that the federal test which consists of "[i]solating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied
factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they

were uttered, indeed may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering
that expression in context." 4 7 6 The State of New York chose to

look at the surrounding circumstances from a reasonable person
perspective specifically for the purpose of giving its citizens extra
protection beyond that afforded under the Federal Constitution.

477
Rojas v. Debevoise & Plimpton
(decided October 27, 1995)

The plaintiff argued that statements made by the plaintiff's
former employer to employees constituted actionable
defamation. 478 In response the defendants argued that the
statements were protected by a qualified privilege. 4 7 9 The court,

agreeing with the defendants, held that the statements were
protected by a qualified privilege, which was not overcome by a

475. Id. at 21.
476. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
917.
477. 634 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
478. Id. at 361-62. In addition to the cause of action for defamation, the
complaint alleged a second cause of action for breach of employment
relationship. Id. at 359. This breach of employment relationship arose out of
an allegation that because the plaintiff "testified truthfully to the FBI" during
the course of an investigation of her employer, she was requested to resign
from her position within the law firm. Id. at 360. The court dismissed this
cause of action because the plaintiff did not proffer any "facts... to show that
defendants frustrated plaintiff's compliance with the core purposes of her
employment" and therefore there was "no breach of contract claim stated." Id.
at 361.
479. Id. at 362.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1996], Art. 35

982

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

showing of actual malice, and also were protected by the free
4 80
speech provision of the New York State Constitution.
In Rojas, the plaintiff alleged that one defendant had said to an
81
employee that the plaintiff had stolen documents from him. 4
The plaintiff also alleged that a former co-worker said to another
former co-worker that the plaintiff was "lying," "not credible,"
"not to be believed" and "crazy." 482
The court began its discussion of the defamation claim by
tersely concluding that the statement concerning stolen documents
was subject to a qualified privilege. 483 The court found that this
privilege is invoked "[w]hen a speaker communicates information
on a subject matter in which he has an interest or in reference to
which he has a duty and such information is communicated to a
"...,,484
The court
person with a corresponding interest or duty .
reasoned that these statements were subject to a qualified
privilege because an employer-employee relationship existed
between the defendant who made the statements and the person
who received the statements. 485
Although the court held that the statements were protected by a
qualified privilege, the plaintiff argued that the statements were
made with "actual malice. "486 The court noted that in order to
show actual malice, the plaintiff "must plead facts showing that
the statement was made with a high degree of awareness of its
probable falsity or that the defendant entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of the matter." 487 In reciting this high evidentiary
480. Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Id. Article I, section 8 provides in
pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Id.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Rojas, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. (citing La Scala v. Dangelo, 104 A.D.2d 930, 931, 480 N.Y.S.2d

546, 547 (2d Dep't 1984) ("It is well settled that when a speaker
communicates information on a subject matter in which he has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty and such information is communicated to a
person with a corresponding interest or duty, a qualified privilege exists.")).
485. Rojas, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
486. Id.

487. Id.
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standard, the court relied upon the court of appeals' decision in
488
Liberman v. Gelstein.

In Liberman, a landlord brought a defamation action against
one of the members of the board of governors of the tenants

association for statements made to a police officer after a
criminal altercation and statements made between the tenants, and
the defendant counterclaimed. 4 89 The court held that the

statements were subject to a qualified privilege and, therefore,
there had to be a showing of "actual malice," or "common law
malice," in order for plaintiff to prevail. 490 The court described
"common law malice" as the existence of "spite or ill will," 49 1
but went on to use the "actual malice" standard under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution 492 as the standard

that a plaintiff must meet in order to overcome a qualified
privilege in New York.493 In meeting this standard, "the plaintiff

must demonstrate that the 'statements [were] made with [a] high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity.'"

4 94

The Liberman

488. 80 N.Y.2d 429, 605 N.E.2d 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1992).
489. Id. at 432-34, 605 N.E.2d at 346-47, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60. The
plaintiff originally alleged five separate slander based causes of action, but by
the time that the case reached the court of appeals, only the second and the
fifth causes of action were alleged. Id. at 432, 605 N.E.2d at 346, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 859. The second cause of action alleged that the plaintiff was
bribing the police in order to avoid receiving parking tickers around the
building. Id. at 433, 605 N.E.2d at 346, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 859. In the fifth
cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant stated, in the presence
of the plaintiff's employees, "Liberman threw a punch at me. He screamed at
my wife and daughter. He called my daughter a slut and threatened to kill me
and my family." Id.
490. Id. at 437-38, 605 N.E.2d at 349-50, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63.
491. Id. at 437, 605 N.E.2d at 349, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
492. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment emphatically
commands: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech. . . ." Id.
493. Liberman, 80 N.Y.2d at 438, 605 N.E.2d at 350, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
863.
494. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)). In

Garrison, the Supreme Court grappled with the question of whether the truth
defense to a charge of defamation should be negated "on a showing of malice
in the sense of iU-will." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 71-72. The charge of
defamation arose after a dispute between the appellant, a district attorney of
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court held that the plaintiff had failed to properly raise the issue
495
of malice and thus could not overcome the qualified privilege.
Once the court in Rojas explained the standard of "actual
malice," the court plainly stated that the plaintiff did not plead
facts which constituted "actual malice" and the mere pleading of
the word "malice" was not sufficient to overcome the qualified
privilege. 496 In addition, the court explained that the defendant
who made the statement about stolen documents admitted not
4 97
having any proof that the documents were actually stolen.
However, the court rejected this as a basis for malice by stating,
"[t]here is a critical difference between not knowing whether
something is true and being highly aware that it is probably false.
498
Only the latter establishes malice."
The remaining statements directed at the credibility of the
plaintiff were summarily dismissed by the court in holding that
those statement were not actionable because "statements of
opinion [are] protected by the broad free speech provision of the
Louisiana, and certain state court judges at which time appellant made certain
disparaging statements at a press conference against the judges to the effect
that the judges were, inter alia, ineffective, lazy and hampered the district
attorney's efforts at enforcing the vice laws. Id. at 64-66. The Court
determined that the "ill-will" standard set forth in the Louisiana defamation
statute was "constitutionally invalid... in the context of criticism of the
official conduct of public officials." Id. at 77. Thus, the Court reversed
appellant's conviction under this statute holding that a showing of malice in the
sense of ill-will cannot negate the truth defense. Id. at 78-79. However, those
statements made with "knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of
whether they are true or false" will be subject to a charge of defamation. Id.
495. Liberman, 80 N.Y.2d at 439, 605 N.E.2d at 350, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
863.
496. Rojas, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citing Doherty v. New York Tel. Co.,
202 A.D.2d 627, 628, 609 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that
"the alleged defamatory statements were clearly entitled to a qualified
privilege, which was not overcome by the plaintiff's conclusory allegations that
the statements were published with actual malice.")). See also Buckley v.
Litman, 57 N.Y.2d 516, 521, 443 N.E.2d 469, 471, 457 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223
(1986) (finding that no proof of malice on the part of the defendant was offered
by plaintiff to establish a cause of action for liable).
497. Rojas, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
498. Id.
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New York State Constitution." 4 99 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied upon the court of appeals case of Inununo AG. v.
Moor-Jankowski,500 where a libel action was brought against the
editor of a magazine which printed a letter critical of an article
and the persons within the article. 50 1 The Imnuno court held that
the statements did not constitute actionable defamation because
they amounted to opinions which were strongly protected by the
New York State Constitution. 50 2 The court in Immuno stated that
"the protection afforded by the guarantees of free press and
speech in the New York Constitution is often broader than the
minimum required by the Federal Constitution." 503 The court
reasoned that the difference in the language protecting speech
within the State Constitution and the Federal Constitution, which
was ratified thirty years prior to New York's Constitution,
demonstrated an intent by New York to treat free speech
differently from the federal government. 504 Furthermore, New
York has had a long and rich history of protecting the liberty of
the press even prior to the application of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution to the States. 505 Even with the
existence of differences in the protection of free speech, the court
of appeals held that the tradition of liberty guaranteed under both
the New York State Constitution and the Federal Constitution

499. Id. (citing Polish Am. Immigration Relief Comm., Inc. v. Relax, 189
A.D.2d 370, 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (1st Dep't 1993) ("The words at
issue here are clearly rhetorical hyperbole and vigorous epithet, and thus
constitute non-actionable expressions of opinion under Federal or State
Constitutional standards.")). See also Goetz v. Kunstler, 164 Misc. 2d 557,
562, 625 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995) (stating that a
statement of opinion which does not imply facts about the person described is
not actionable).
500. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied,
500 U.S. 954 (1991).
501. Id. at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.

502. Id. at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
503. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citations

omitted).
504. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
505. Id.
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required a dismissal of the claim as non-actionable opinion. 506
Thus, in relying on the court's holding in Immuno, the Rojas
court drew on the distinction between the New York State and
Federal Constitutions in its analysis of protection of speech which
constitutes mere opinion, by relying solely on the New York
State Constitution. 507
In conclusion, the court in Rojas has afforded a large measure
of protection to speech that comes under a qualified privilege
under both the New York State and Federal Constitutions.
However, in its analysis of opinionated speech, the court only
relies on the broader protection afforded to such speech under the
New York State Constitution.

506. Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
507. Rojas, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The court in Rojas held that "the
comments that plaintiff is 'crazy' 'lying' and 'not credible' are non-actionable
statements of opinion protected under the broad free speech provision of the
New York State Constitution." Id.
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